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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: SPEAKING TO BE
UNDERSTOOD: IDENTITY AND THE POLITICS OF
RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Emily Hughes*
INTRODUCTION
In the opening pages of The Alchemy of Race and Rights,1 Patricia
Williams discloses that as she writes the first chapter, she is sitting in
an "old terry bathrobe with a little fringe of blue and white tassels
dangling from the hem," is having a "bad morning," and "hate[s] being
a lawyer."'2 Whatever the reader may think of these frank admissions,
Williams positions herself in the text in a way that is both bold and
vulnerable. Unfolding the complexity of her identity-from her
penchant for wearing terry bathrobes to her elite status as a law pro-
fessor-Williams attempts to make the complexity of the politics of
race and rights both sensible and intelligible, "[s]ince subject position
is everything in [her] analysis of the law."' 3 Williams' strategy calls to
mind bell hooks in talking back: thinking feminist, thinking black,4
when hooks writes that "if [we] do not speak in a language that can be
understood, then there is little chance for dialogue."' 5 By speaking in
a language that is imminently understandable-who hasn't sat in his
or her bathrobe on a given morning with some self-doubt or reserva-
tion about his or her chosen profession?-Williams makes connec-
tions "between lived experience and social perception."'6 In so doing,
she digs through the politics of race and rights to expose its layered
complexity, thereby creating a dialogue with her readers by pulling
* Emily Hughes is Associate Director of the Center for Justice in Capital Cases at DePaul
University College of Law. The author would like to thank Susan Bandes and Andrea D. Lyon
for their invitation to write this concluding Article and for their time reviewing earlier drafts of
it, Margaret Willard-Traub for her keen insight, and Maryam Toghraee and Julie Darr for their
research assistance.
1. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
2. Id. at 3-4.
3. Id. at 3.
4. BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK (1989).
5. Id. at 78.
6. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8.
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them into the text and challenging them to not only read what she has
to say, but to truly hear and understand it.7
More than ten years later s the politics of identity and race are not
only being reshaped and redefined from within, they have come head-
to-head with the politics of the death penalty. In the keynote lunch-
eon address at the Race to Execution Symposium, Bryan Stevenson
challenged his audience to
begin thinking about the identity we need to take. Because . . . it is
an identity that not only has to say what must be said to make these
issues sensible and intelligible, but it's also an identity that has to be
willing to confront decisionmakers, policymakers, judges, [and]
sometimes lawyers who believe and accept that racially biased ad-
ministration of the death penalty is something that we're supposed
to just get used to.9
In framing the critical issues underlying the Symposium mandate,
Stevenson challenges law professors, practitioners, and law students to
think critically about the identity they must take10 to confront and
challenge the politics of race and the death penalty, rather than ac-
cepting and rationalizing the status quo.
The status quo is not a pretty picture. As Samuel Gross explains,
death row is filled with "a substantial over-representation" of African
Americans-"whites are 46%, African Americans ... are 42%, and
Latinos are 10%"-even though African Americans are only "about
13% of the population."'1 While the racially-biased administration of
the death penalty is disturbing, the "disparity is not totally surpris-
ing," 12 in part because of the "unmistakable, unanswerable discrimi-
7. Id. ("I will try to write, moreover, in a way that bridges the traditional gap between theory
and praxis. It is not my goal merely to simplify; I hope that the result will be a text that is
multilayered-that encompasses the straightforwardness of real life and reveals complexity of
meaning."); see also Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address at the DePaul University College of
Law Race to Execution Symposium (Oct. 24, 2003), in 53 DEPAUL L. REV. - (2004).
8. Williams published The Alchemy of Race and Rights in 1991; hooks published talking back:
thinking feminist, thinking black in 1989.
9. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1706-07.
10. Id. at 1700. Stevenson stated:
[W]hile I'm not someone who engages in identity politics as such, I do think the kind of
identity we create for ourselves ... is key to our ability to effectively say something that
makes a difference. And you can sometimes say something sensible ...but if you
haven't supported what you say, what you do, with a kind of witness, with a kind of
structure, with a kind of integrity that allows what you say and do to be meaningful, a
lot of times it doesn't have significance.
Id.
11. Samuel Gross, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-




nation by race of victim.' 3 What this means is that "[t]hose who were
charged with killing white victims are far more likely to be sentenced
to death than those who were charged with killing black victims.' 4
David Baldus, author of the famous "Baldus Study" discussed in Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 15 uses statistical analysis to document race-of-victim
discrimination within the administration of the death penalty. 16
Baldus proffers that "race-of-victim discrimination is both unconstitu-
tional and immoral" and contends that the execution of many offend-
ers, who would be serving terms of life imprisonment but for the race
of their victims, seriously impairs the legitimacy of the death penalty
system in which it exists. 17
Underscoring the statistically grounded observations of both Baldus
and Gross are the personal observations of Eugene Pincham, an Afri-
can-American attorney and former judge who was born in Chicago,
then grew up in poverty in Limestone County, Alabama, eventually
working his way through both college and law school. 18 Pincham
states that he does not "know why it surprises us that racism is in-
volved in the death penalty .... Racism is involved in every walk of
life" and we must be "willing to recognize it and confront it, do some-
thing about it."' 9
Recognizing and confronting the racism inherent in the administra-
tion of the death penalty is at the forefront of Bryan Stevenson's mes-
sage. In explaining the importance of confronting the discriminatory
13. Id. at 9. "[N]early half of all homicide victims in the United States are African Ameri-
can," while "only 12% of those who ... have been executed in the past 30 some years, have been
executed for killings of black victims as compared to about 80% for white victims. A dispropor-
tion . . .on the order of a factor of 6.5." Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 9.
15. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
16. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capi-
tal Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411
(2004).
17. Id. at 1414, Part III.
18. Albert Alschuler, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution
Symposium 98 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review). See also R. Eugene
Pincham, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Symposium 100
(Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Pincham Transcript].
Pincham explained to the audience:
You have just been misinformed about me. I did not grow up in poverty. We were not
indigent .... My family was not impoverished. We were not economically deprived.
We were not economically or socially maladjusted. We was "po." I did not say poor
because we couldn't afford the four letters it took to spell the word. We was "po" ...
p.o. As a matter of fact, the shack in which I was reared in Limestone County, Ala-
bama, it leaked so bad, the roof was so bad.., we had to go outdoors to stand under a
tree when it rained to keep from getting wet.
Id.
19. Pincham Transcript, supra note 18, at 102.
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status quo, Stevenson recalled the United States Supreme Court's
conclusion in McCleskey v. Kemp that "a certain amount of bias, a
certain quantum of discrimination, if you will, is in the [C]ourt's opin-
ion inevitable. '20 Turning pointedly to his audience, Stevenson chal-
lenged that "we are gathered in this room talking about race and the
death penalty while the United States Supreme Court has already said
it's pointless for [us] to be here. These problems are inevitable. '21
Rather than succumb to such defeatist attitudes, however, Stevenson
highlights the foresighted thinking of Justice William J. Brennan's dis-
sent in McCleskey, wherein Brennan "ridiculed the [C]ourt's analysis
as a 'fear of too much justice." 22
To speak in a language that can be understood, therefore, we must
"say something much bolder, much louder, much clearer if we're go-
ing to make any progress with these issues."' 23 We must "think about
... the way we position ourselves" 24 and "be hopeful about what we
can do."' 25 Stevenson suggests that we must "[c]hange not only the
thinking of the decisionmakers but change the decisionmakers [them-
selves]." '26 The decisionmakers whose thinking and identity must
change include five key players: the jury, judge, policymakers (includ-
ing the media), prosecutors, and defense attorneys.27
Using Stevenson's five-part framework provides a prism through
which to view the comments of the other conference speakers, a juxta-
position that enables critical analysis about the identity of each of the
20. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1706. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 ("At most, the Baldus
study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sen-
tencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.").
21. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1706.
22. Id. In his dissent in McCleskey, Justice Brennan stated:
The Court next states that its unwillingness to regard petitioner's evidence as sufficient
is based in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey's claim would open the door
to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing .... Taken on its face,
such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice. Yet surely the majority
would acknowledge that if striking evidence indicated that other minority groups, or
women, or even persons with blond hair, were disproportionately sentenced to death,
such a state of affairs would be repugnant to deeply rooted conceptions of fairness.
The prospect that there may be more widespread abuse than McCleskey documents
may be dismaying, but it does not justify complete abdication of our judicial role. The
Constitution was framed fundamentally as a bulwark against governmental power, and
preventing the arbitrary administration of punishment is a basic ideal of any society
that purports to be governed by the rule of law.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339.
23. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1707.
24. Id. at 1709.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1710.
27. See id.
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decisionmakers, as well as valuable insight into how each of the deci-
sionmakers thinks-a first step to speaking to each of them in a lan-
guage that can be understood in order to subvert any residual "fear of
too much justice. '28
II. THE IDENTITY OF THE JURY
In their seminal work through the Capital Jury Project, 29 William
Bowers and Maria Sandys designed a project to discover "how real
jurors in real cases think and decide things. ' 30 The findings that Bow-
ers and Sandys discussed at the Race to Execution Symposium in-
cluded the observation that "the race of juror[s] is figuring in a
pronounced way in the imposition [of the death penalty] in capital
sentencing."'31 Specifically, if the defendant is black and the victim
white, the "race of the juror [has] the most pronounced affect on the
sentencing outcome[s]. '' 32 For example, "[w]hen there are five or
more white males on the jury, the percent of those cases that went on
to [result in] death sentences is 71%. When there [are] fewer it's
30%. ''33 In contrast, if "there [are] one or more black men on the
jury, the likelihood of a death sentence is far reduced, from 70% to
36%. ''34 Bowers and Sandys explain that race "permeates these deci-
sions and oftentimes it comes in, in the most obscure ways you would
[not] necessarily expect. ' 35 In sum, they could "go through every one
of these cases that we have and show where race has come into play
even when you have an all white jury. '36
Recognizing both the reality of how race affects juror outcomes and
the difficulty of learning each juror's position on this issue, Pincham
explained that when he selected a jury, he "tried to make people real-
28. Id. at 1706.
29. See William J. Bowers, Maria Sandys & Tom Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A
Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant Is Black and
the Victim Is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497 (2004).
30. William J. Bowers, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution
Symposium 81 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Bowers
Transcript].
31. Id. at 86.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 87.
35. Maria Sandys, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-
posium 93 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Sandys
Transcript].
36. Id. at 96 ("There are cases where the jurors [on all-white juries] talk about how [they]
have to talk about blacks from the attitudes of blacks because [the defendant] was black. And




ize that bigotry and bias are natural human emotions." He went on to
state: "And it's hypocritical, it's just an outright lie to sit up and say I
don't have any biases. It's crazy. I tried to make people comfortable
with their biases and acknowledge that they had them and commit not
to allow their biases to influence them. '37 The goal of giving jurors
the space to be comfortable to acknowledge their biases, while at the
same time enabling jurors to commit to not allowing their biases to
negatively impact their ability to make the right decision, is easier said
than done.
Part of the reason this goal is so difficult is because of the "empathic
divide" 38 that Craig Haney has identified. In Haney's work analyzing
racially discriminatory death sentences, he discusses how structural ra-
cism underlies the "empathic divide" between blacks and whites, cre-
ating a tendency for white jurors to withhold compassion if the
defendant is black in ways they would not withhold compassion if the
defendant was white. 39 Haney goes on to say that black and white
jurors "actually hear and weigh evidence differently, in cases in which
the same evidence is offered on behalf of white defendants as opposed
to African-American defendants." 40 This not only means that white
jurors "judge [exactly the same evidence of] mitigation as more miti-
gating .. .when it is offered on behalf of a white defendant, as op-
posed to a black defendant,"' but it also means that white jurors may
actually switch whether they view evidence offered in mitigation as
aggravating or mitigating evidence, depending on whether it is offered
on behalf of a black or a white defendant.42 In short, because "the
barrier is much higher when the defendant is African American, that
empathic divide is a much more difficult one [for white jurors] to get
over, and so they hear the same evidence, but they don't use it in the
same way . . . [because] they don't attach the mitigating weight or
significance to it when it is offered on behalf of African-American
defendants. '43 While this empathic divide is not "impossible to trav-
erse," it is nonetheless "difficult to get past."44
37. Pincham Transcript, supra note 18, at 110.
38. Craig Haney, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-
posium 224 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Haney
Transcript].
39. Id. at 224.
40. Id. at 223.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 224.
43. Id.
44. Haney Transcript, supra note 38, at 224.
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As difficult as it may be to bridge the empathic divide, Raymond
Brown suggests that one way to do so is by speaking to the public
directly about these issues.45 According to Brown, "It is somewhat of
an elitist notion to think that fundamental notions of justice, whatever
they are, whether they have psychological or statistical or legal nu-
ances, cannot be understood as well by those who do not have our
formal training. It is a conceit, it is arrogant, and it is a failure to come
to grips with our duties and our responsibilities. ' 46 Andrea Lyon
agrees, explaining that one way to traverse the empathic divide is to
acknowledge the importance of race when it is both a salient and
nonsalient part of the case.47 When race is salient, "direct comment
through cross-examination, direct examination, or in opening or clos-
ing statements is warranted. ' 48 Lyon explains the techniques of "self-
disclosure, not judging the feelings the jurors might have, and helping
jurors to get to a place at which they can understand and adjust for
what they feel" as methods by which an attorney might engage in an
"honest unveiling of the obvious. ' 49 Even when race is not salient,
however, race may still remain a factor that must be addressed. 50 In
such circumstances, one way to bridge the empathic divide caused by
race is to provide jurors a way to see and feel the concept the attorney
hopes they will understand. Lyon provides the example of a capital
defendant and victim who are both members of the same minority
group. The attorney would like the jury to understand that the defen-
dant was armed because of the dangerousness of the neighborhood in
which he lived, but the attorney worries that communicating this idea
will only distance the jury further from the defendant.51 Rather than
telling the jury the neighborhood is dangerous, the attorney shows the
jury through a video camera on a street corner that records the events
of a typical day.52 In this way, the attorney bridges the empathic di-
vide otherwise caused by race-no matter how nonsalient it may be-
in order to help "jurors to get to the place at which they can under-
stand and adjust for what they feel."'53
45. See generally Raymond Brown, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race
to Execution Symposium 301 (Oct. 25, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [here-
inafter Brown Transcript].
46. Id. at 315.
47. Andrea D. Lyon, Naming the Dragon: Litigating Race Issues During a Death Penalty Trial,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1647, 1659-61 (2004).





53. Lyon, supra note 47, at 1660.
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George Kendall takes Brown's demand to "come to grips with our
duties and responsibilities, '54 as well as Stevenson's charge to rethink
the identity of juries, 5 by proposing radical changes in the very
method by which juries are chosen.56 Rather than using peremptory
strikes to eliminate jurors, Kendall suggests that attorneys consider
the idea of first qualifying a pool of jurors, then allowing each side to
pick half of the jurors for the petit jury from the qualified pool. 57
Given that the current method of jury selection has failed to work
despite the numerous post-Batson58 contortions the Supreme Court
has tried,59 Kendall questions the harm of at least trying something
different. 60
Stevenson's charge to first understand, then change, the identity of
the decisionmakers who form capital juries is both complicated and
hotly debated. While the speakers may not have reached a consensus
on how best to traverse the empathic divide that race creates in capital
juries, they all agree that it is not only possible to do so, but that it
absolutely must be done.
III. THE IDENTITY OF THE JUDGE
At the most basic level, the racial identity of judges must change
because "[t]here are too few people of color in the judge role. ' 61 The
racial bias that some white judges bring to the bench can be absolutely
blatant, such as a Florida judge who used racial slurs in open court
when he referred to the parents of a black capital defendant, 62 but the
more subtle effects of race also threaten our ability to strive for equal
justice under the law, in part because of their hidden and hard-to-
identify aspects.63 Indeed, George Kendall notes the reality of elected
54. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 315.
55. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1711-12.
56. George Kendall, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution
Symposium 32 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Kendall
Transcript].
57. Id.
58. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
59. See Kendall Transcript, supra note 56, at 31 (stating that Batson has been a "massive disap-
pointment because again .. .the interest in protecting the prosecutor's discretion to use a per-
emptory challenge is way overvalued against the interest in ferreting out and remedying and
ending discrimination").
60. Id. at 32.
61. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1710.
62. Id. at 130.
63. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995).
1682 [Vol. 53:1675
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judges needing the support of the white community instead of the
black, and how this dependency leads to bias.64
Sheri Lynn Johnson discusses not only the covert bias that exists in
all decisionmakers within the capital jury system, but also the way
such bias can be utterly unconscious. 65 In a simple experiment con-
ducted within a few minutes at the Symposium, Johnson timed audi-
ence participants as they attempted to pair white faces with "good"
connotation words and black faces with "bad" connotation words,
then she timed participants again as they paired white faces with
"bad" connotation words and black faces with "good" connotation
words.66 After tallying their own results, the audience-a group com-
posed of capital defense attorneys, academics, and students-seemed
truly surprised at how race filtered into their own thinking. 67 Johnson
has administered the test to approximately one million people, and
the results indicate that "about three quarters of white Americans find
it substantially easier to classify white with good than they do to clas-
sify black with good. ' 68 While African Americans are "a more com-
plicated group ... , [o]n average they find it equally easy to lump
[whites and blacks] all together, but in fact if you look at individual
scores, there's a wide variation. ' 69 Johnson's observation that "most
people are surprised to see these results for themselves" 70 underscores
the possibility that unconscious racism is possibly the most dangerous
bias of all because people are probably not trying to overcome some-
thing they do not even realize is within themselves. 71
IV. THE IDENTITY OF THE POLICYMAKER
Rory Little served as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the
United States Department of Justice from 1996 until 1997, where he
was responsible for selecting the federal cases in which prosecutors
64. Kendall Transcript, supra note 56, at 26.
65. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution
Symposium 41-42 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter John-
son Transcript]; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of
Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1534 (2004).
66. See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 65, at 1543 (describing the Implicit Association
Test).
67. See Sandys Transcript, supra note 35, at 89 (discussing Johnson's work).
68. Johnson Transcript, supra note 65, at 37.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 41.
71. See id. at 41-42 ("So I don't know that people are trying to overcome something that they
don't know is there, which is of course the evangelistic reason that I'm giving you this test as well
as demonstrating it so you get to see it in yourselves.").
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could continue pursuing the death penalty.72 His writings about the
federal death penalty not only reveal the geographic and racial dispar-
ity in its administration, 73 but go one step further by challenging the
very conceptualization of the roots of the injustice. Little states that
the supposedly "race-blind system" of choosing the federal cases for
which prosecutors may pursue the death penalty does not work be-
cause "whatever is happening is happening earlier, when there's no
race blindness" 74 (i.e., the roots of the injustice manifest themselves
long before the case is subject to the "race-blind" review).
One of the roots of this injustice is the role of the media in shaping
policy-making decisions. Rob Warden, cofounder and Executive Di-
rector of the Center for Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law and an award-winning legal affairs journalist,
believes that, although the media has undergone a "revolution in [its]
approach to criminal justice" and the public will see even more ad-
vances in the years to come,75 injustices continue to exist. Raymond
Brown underscored the fact that media reporting is a competitive eco-
nomic enterprise operating under the mantra: "If it bleeds, it leads. ' 76
In the last decade alone, while violence declined by 30%, the network
coverage of violence increased by 500%. 77
John Conroy is a staff writer for the Chicago Reader, an alternative
news weekly with a circulation of about 150,000.78 Conroy describes
how the federal courthouse in Chicago has more than twenty court-
rooms, but only one reporter from each major daily newspaper work-
ing those courtrooms, thereby ensuring that even the most diligent
reporter inevitably "misses things. ' 79 Similarly, the Cook County
72. See Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race
Disparity Versus Specific Guilt and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591
(2004). See also Judge Nan Nolan, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to
Execution Symposium 192-93 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review).
73. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999) [hereinafter Little, Federal
Death Penalty]; Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty Moratorium?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791
(2001).
74. Rory K. Little, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution
Symposium 198 (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Little
Transcript].
75. Rob Warden, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-
posium 296 (Oct. 25, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Warden
Transcript].
76. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 303.
77. Id. at 303-04.
78. John Conroy, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-





courthouse in downtown Chicago has a felony caseload of approxi-
mately 30,000 cases per year, and yet only one reporter from each
paper is assigned to cover it.80 It is within this context, Conroy ex-
plains, that he wrote the now famous series of articles exposing severe
police brutality within Chicago's police force."' This brutality in-
cluded one of the primary culprits-Commander Jon Burge-being
thrown off Chicago's police force in 1993, as well as the City of Chi-
cago admitting, in 1994, that torture had occurred. 82 As Conroy ob-
served the trial in the county courtroom, he was sure he had only one
crack at the story, certain that once he wrote his first article exposing
the systemic brutality within Chicago's police force, the major dailies
would pick up the story and run with it.83 But to Conroy's surprise,
"that didn't happen."8 4 After Conroy published his first story putting
the picture together, the "dailies didn't report it."' 85 Conroy then ac-
knowledged that the Chicago Tribune's coverage of such events is now
vastly different than it was in 1993 and 1994, but he pointed out that
"[elven today, the New York Times has only mentioned these torture
cases twice: once in 1993 when the ... police union was going to put
Burge on a float in the St. Patrick's Day Parade, and then earlier this
year when the four pardons [for torture victims] came down." 86
Why is there such lack of coverage about such a riveting subject as
police torture? Conroy proffers several reasons for this, including the
observation that "to stand up for somebody who is on death row is
difficult for a lot of people, '8 7 but to stand up and say that person was
tortured means that other people, who were not so honorable, were
also tortured. 88 Put another way, while it is difficult to stand up for
defendants facing capital crimes, it is almost unbearably difficult to
stand up for defendants who are factually guilty of the crime for which
they are accused, when standing up for those defendants means accus-
ing a respected police officer of participating in system-wide discrimi-
80. Id. at 278.
81. John Conroy, House of Screams, CH. READER, Jan. 26, 1990, § 1, at 1; John Conroy, This
Is a Magic Can, CHI. READER, May 27, 2000, § 1, at 1; John Conroy, Deaf to the Screams, CHI.
READER, Aug. 1, 2003, § 1, at 1; see also JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEO-
PLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE (2000).
82. Conroy Transcript, supra note 78, at 278.
83. Id. at 277.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 278.
86. Id. On January 10, 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan pardoned four men who had
been sentenced to death in Illinois: Madison Hobley, Stanley Howard, Aaron Patterson, and
Leroy Orange. See Steve Mills et al., The System Has Failed, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2003, at N19.
87. Conroy Transcript, supra note 78, at 279.
88. Id. at 279-80.
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nation in our racial justice system. In Conroy's words, just as it is
"unpalatable" for the citizenry, so is it unpalatable for newspapers and
reporters "to be willing to say that this highly decorated, seemingly
upstanding police officer, [a] very personable guy, pulled down a
man's pants and put a cattle prod to his testicles and up his rectum." 89
Another reason stems from the fact that the press is largely reac-
tive. This means that, as a general rule, if the public is not outraged
about an incident "or if the protest comes from what [the press] con-
sider[s] [to be] the usual agitators, then the press feels no urgency" to
report about that incident.90 While such reasoning may help to ex-
plain why the major dailies did not pursue the police torture story in
the way that Conroy anticipated they would, the analysis introduces a
bit of the chicken-and-the-egg phenomenon: the stories that the ma-
jor dailies choose to cover-and how they choose to cover them-may
ultimately influence the stories about which the public is outraged
(i.e., how can the public be outraged about an incident if they do not
know it has happened?). Indeed, Marc Mauer proposed another way
to view this dilemma by asking, "How do we advance the issue of race
and what often [are] hostile political climate issues that we care about
very deeply, [when] the public is not necessarily with us all the way on
that?" 91
Raymond Brown provides a partial answer by questioning any un-
derlying assumption that the public is not passionate about race and
justice.92 A well-known former anchor for Court TV, Brown explains
that as he travels around the country, people stop him because he
looks familiar, although they do not always know why he is familiar.
Once they determine that they have seen him on television, 93 Brown
explains that people usually launch into a heated discussion of racial
justice issues. While he may not always agree with their perspective,
and while he is absolutely tired of discussing "whether O.J. did it,"'9 4
he finds that "inevitably people want to get involved in details, discus-
sions about justice, and they care passionately about justice. ''95
Brown underscores the importance of this passion by stating:
89. Id. at 280.
90. Id.
91. Marc Mauer, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-
posium 332 (Oct. 25, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Mauer
Transcript].
92. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 306-07.
93. In addition to being a former anchor for Court TV, Brown hosts the nationally syndicated
public television program Inside the Law and serves as a legal analyst for MSNBC.
94. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 307.
95. Id. at 306.
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[Tihe reason that a defense lawyer ever has a chance is if the de-
fense lawyer has a limited belief in the possibility of human redemp-
tion .... [I]f you know that almost every[one] wants at some level
to perceive themselves as fair and if you work past their biases
about gender, about sexuality, about race, about these other charac-
teristics, if you can get to that point where the person's sense of
fairness lies, you've got a chance; you've got a chance and that's
part of the good news .... 96
Brown then turns his analysis into a question, asking if Lee Malvo
was white, whether there "would be a more spirited discussion about
the appropriateness of the death penalty for him in the national me-
dia, in the national discourse, the national conversation. ' 97 In re-
sponse to Brown's question, Scott Turow, who, in addition to being a
renowned writer and attorney, also served on Governor George
Ryan's Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment, volunteered the
following observation:
What flashed into my mind [when I heard Brown's question] ... was
[when] John Walker Lynn was arrested, now he was an American
citizen who .... to give credence to the prosecution theory, was
responsible for the death of American soldiers and literally, George
W. Bush remarked, when first confronted about this, "Sounds like a
mixed up kid," which is very much what I think [Raymond Brown]
is talking about .... [Y]ou know, child of privilege ... how does he
end up as a[n] ... Islamic extremist in Afghanistan, must be a mixed
up kid... [w]hereas Malvo is named bloodthirsty murderer .... 98
Two months after Turow made this observation at the conference, a
Virginia jury sentenced Malvo to life in prison without the possibility
of parole, rather than death.99 The media commentary following this
decision included descriptions of the brilliant defense strategy that re-
sulted in the life verdict, as well as the fact that juries are reluctant to
sentence a juvenile to death.10° That a critical assessment of the inter-
96. Id. at 307.
97. Id. at 299; see also Raymond M. Brown, The "American Taliban" vs. The "Junior Beltway
Sniper": Toward Understanding Death, "Brainwashing," "Terror," and Race in the Court of Pub-
lic Opinion, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1663 (2004) (discussing the media's failure to consider race as a
distinguishing factor in Lee Boyd Malvo and John Walker Lindh's cases).
98. Scott Turow, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-
posium 347-48 (Oct. 25, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review).
99. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Penalty for Young Sniper Could Spur Change in Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2003, at A12 (discussing the potential impact of the Virginia jury's December 23, 2003
decision to sentence Malvo to life in prison without the possibility of parole).
100. See, e.g., Judy Woodruffs Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 23, 2003) (Jef-
frey Toobin, CNN legal analyst, stated, in response to breaking news of the Malvo sentence, that
he "think[s] the defense strategy, which was to try this insanity defense, in the guilt phase, which
really wasn't much of an insanity defense, was really just setting the stage for a penalty phase
defense. It worked very well. I think it was extremely artfully designed. And obviously, very
successful." Then Jeanne Meserve, CNN correspondent, added that she had spoken with a juror
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play between race and the jury's decision not to sentence Malvo to
death was not part of the media reports begs a slight rephrasing of
Raymond Brown's original question. If Lee Malvo had been white
rather than black, would the media have been quicker to conclude
that "justice was served" or the "right result [was] reached" by the
jury's decision, rather than crediting the result to the skill of Malvo's
lawyers or the jury's reluctance to sentence a juvenile to death?
While people may believe that the media's lack of critical race com-
mentary in the reporting of Lee Malvo's verdict is a step in the direc-
tion of "race neutrality," a final observation by Brown complicates
such a possibility. Brown maintains that the "idea of race" being be-
hind us "wrongly influences the media," whether it be television,
print, or radio. Even though the various media forms are "all . . .
quite different and function by different rules," the media focuses the
public on the question of whether the person "did it"-rather than
focusing on the due process concerns involved in the question of
whether the person got "a fair trial." 10 1 Taking this observation one
step further, Brown offers the example of New Jersey, where both the
media and law enforcement are "anxious" to execute a white person
first, which "is perverse because the use of race is always perverse in
these matters. ' 10 2 Brown maintains that the media and law enforce-
ment's desire "to say we've got a white guy who's going to fry first" is
"almost an attempt to engage in this denial to say race isn't a fac-
tor."' 1 3 Such an analysis is not limited to New Jersey for, as Rory
Little explains, "Timothy McVeigh looms as the poster child for the
federal death penalty. ' 10 4 Just as both media and law enforcement
who had sentenced John Allen Muhammad to death, but who said if she had been the juror for
Malvo's case, she "could not [have] give[n] the death penalty to Lee Malvo ... because he is 17
years old." Meserve summarized that the "juvenile issue weighed very, very heavily with her.");
Newsnight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 23, 2003) (After Aaron Brown
provided background to the sentence by stating that to "many, everything about the case seemed
tailor-made for the death sentence," Jeanne Meserve's voice-over stated, "Seventeen, that num-
ber appears to have saved Lee Malvo's life. Seventeen was his age when he went on a spree with
John Muhammad, a spree that left 10 people dead."); The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News television
broadcast, Dec. 23, 2003) (Fox News Senior Judicial Analyst, Judge Andrew Napolitano, re-
sponded to the question of how he would explain the verdict by stating, "The only rational
explanation here ... is the reluctance on the part of the good people of Virginia to impose death
on a young man. That is really the only redeeming factor ... that [he was] 17 at the time." Then,
after Napolitano was questioned about whether the jury might not have also thought it was
possible that Malvo was brainwashed, Napolitano responded that although it "probably went
through their minds," he thought the jury ultimately rejected that rationale, because "it would be
inconsistent for them to have rejected it in the trial and accepted it in the penalty phase.").
101. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 301-02.
102. Id. at 317.
103. Id.
104. Little Transcript, supra note 74, at 206; see also Little, supra note 72, at 1604.
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may be "anxious" to execute a white person first-and just as the na-
tion as a whole was "anxious" to execute Timothy McVeigh-so do
the intentions of one of the chief arms of law enforcement, the prose-
cutor, play a critical role in the ultimate decision of which cases to
pursue in the capital arena.
V. THE IDENTITY OF THE PROSECUTOR
Although the roots of injustice manifest themselves long before a
federal case is subject to any "race-blind system" of choosing federal
death cases, 0 5 it is important to analyze the identity and thinking pro-
cess of those prosecutors who have the initial responsibility of pursu-
ing the death penalty. As a preliminary matter, George Kendall
points out that charging decisions today are still made overwhelmingly
by white prosecutors. Kendall explains that "98% of the deci-
sionmakers in the prosecutor's office who were deciding whether to
seek the death penalty in a given case are white. ' 10 6 In light of John-
son's observation that racial bias permeates the unconscious thinking
process of "all the actors who play a part in capital cases,"'1 7 one must
question any true possibility of achieving "race-neutral" justice.
Add to that mix the observations of Rory Little, and a bleak picture
emerges. A former federal prosecutor himself, Little has explored the
issue of "what federal prosecutors really think" and has offered two
primary strands of commonality: (1) federal prosecutors really think
their "defendants are guilty";108 and (2) even though most federal
prosecutors may be aware of alarming statistics suggesting that racial
bias permeates the administration of the death penalty, "they are puz-
zled by the idea that they should drop a particular specific prosecution
because of race bias statistics generally."' 1 9 This means that regard-
less of other systemic problems about which federal prosecutors are
aware, federal prosecutors do not think racial bias plays a part in their
particular cases. "[T]hey believe they've looked through their files
and they are prosecuting people who are not just guilty, but who are
free of bias and not innocent .... And so these prosecutors look at
each other and say, 'I'm supposed to drop my case against a heinous,
guilty person because of a statistical disparity that doesn't exist in my
case?' "110
105. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
106. Kendall Transcript, supra note 56, at 25.
107. Johnson Transcript, supra note 65, at 34.
108. Little Transcript, supra note 74, at 204; see also Little, supra note 72, at 1602.




In the same way that Haney's "empathic divide" can be linked to
jurors withholding compassion for a defendant who is black in ways
they would not if the defendant was white,"' so does the same struc-
tural racism operate within prosecutors. Little believes the idea of
"unconscious racial empathy"11 2 may be where the roots of
"prosecutorial and investigatorial bias" actually begin.' 3
Juxtaposed against such an observation is Robert Warden's histori-
cal analysis of the ability of prosecutors to concede error in capital
cases. According to Warden, prosecutors were historically "much
more willing to admit they had made errors" than they are currently
willing to do.114 He attributes one of the main differences between
then and now to the fact that, historically, the only people who were
given the benefit of a trial were white, while black people who were
accused of crimes were lynched."15 In Warden's words: "Trials were
for white people and when the mistakes were discovered, the prosecu-
tion seemed pretty willing to acknowledge them. 1" 6
Just as it is unsettling that prosecutors were more willing to admit
error in charging decisions before the advent of DNA or other ad-
vances in technology, so is it alarming that prosecutors may be well
versed in the systemic pervasiveness of racial bias in everything from
charging decisions to jury verdicts, but refuse to acknowledge that
such systemic problems apply in their own cases. Such an observation
implies that no matter how many statistical studies document the per-
vasiveness of racial bias,1 17 such studies may be landing on deaf ears.
In the same way, the Supreme Court accepted the statistical validity of
David Baldus's seminal work in McCleskey, then refused to find it
relevant in McCleskey's case." 8 And thus the analysis comes full cir-
cle, harkening back to the Supreme Court's chilling concession that
111. See Haney discussion supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
112. Little Transcript, supra note 74, at 204; see also Little, Federal Death Penalty, supra note
73, at 484-90.
113. Little Transcript, supra note 74, at 204.
114. Warden Transcript, supra note 75, at 287.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Gross Transcript, supra note 11, at 14-15 (Prosecutors generally "prefer white juries
and white jurors to black juries and black jurors," not only because African Americans are
"more likely to be skeptical of the truthfulness of the representatives of the criminal justice
system," but also because the "concreteness of the experience that African Americans have with
the criminal justice system has other and deeper implications . . . . [O]ver 10% of African-
American males between the ages of 24 and 29 are in prison right now.").
118. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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some amount of disparity in the administration of the death penalty is
"inevitable."'19
It is precisely at such moments when Bryan Stevenson demands
that one consider "what it means to do the difficult"120-to shake
things up and make noise in a way that makes the demand for change
not only heard and understood, but realized. To this call steps the
defense attorney.
VI. THE IDENTITY OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY
Although the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to be represented by a competent attorney, 121 George Kendall
emphasizes that a key component of establishing such competency is
first establishing trust through a diverse defense team. 122 In fact,
Kendall believes that diversity of race and gender on a defense team is
so important that he "will not do a case anymore as a white defense
lawyer involving a minority defendant unless [he has] a minority co-
counsel with [him]."'1 23 Although the examples Kendall gives to un-
derscore the importance of defense team diversity include a defense
lawyer who had been the former imperial wizard of the Klu Klux
Klan, 124 as well as another case in which the attorney referred to the
defendant as "boy,"'125 such egregious examples are not the only rea-
son diversity is important. The more subtle structural racism that
Johnson describes provides even more reason to ensure diversity on a
defense team 26 because it highlights the fact that even well-inten-
tioned, seemingly empathetic defense attorneys may not be cognizant
of the structural racism clouding their thinking. As Johnson addressed
an audience filled with a substantial number of criminal defense attor-
neys and a majority of white participants, Johnson candidly stated,
"[t]he short story is [I have met] the enemy, and he is us.' 27 One
reason such structural racism infects even the most well-intentioned
defense attorney's performance is because it is unconscious.' 28
119. Id. at 312.
120. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1714.
121. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
122. Kendall Transcript, supra note 56, at 27-28.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Id. at 28.
125. Id.
126. Johnson Transcript, supra note 65, at 38-39; see also discussion supra notes 65-71 and
accompanying text.
127. Johnson Transcript, supra note 65, at 38.
128. Id. at 41. See also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 65.
2004] 1691
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
William Moffit, past president of the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers and a prominent criminal defense attorney who
has appeared on a variety of media programs, 129 addressed the struc-
tural racism issue that afflicts even the best-intentioned defense attor-
ney by calling for more African-American lawyers to practice in
certain areas of the country)a30 As Moffitt explains, "I've had literally
hundreds of lawyers say that they would never practice law in Vir-
ginia, and we desperately [need] black lawyers. We desperately need
African-American lawyers in Virginia, if nothing other than to teach
the system that they can perform at high levels. ' 131 While the mere
addition of more diverse attorneys will not automatically cure the ra-
cism inherent in the administration of the death penalty, Moffitt ex-
plains that improving such diversity "does add a factor, and it is
another factor and it needs to be looked at. It needs to be analyzed
and studied. '132
While Kendall, Johnson, and Moffitt's suggestions focus largely on
improving the diversity of representation within the capital court-
room, both Stevenson and Brown challenge attorneys to broaden
their thinking about how best to instigate change by expanding their
practice to include certain litigation that is outside a defense attor-
ney's traditional role. Such thinking, Stevenson explains, is critical if
we are going to create an identity that allows us to deal with this prob-
lem of under-representation and "change the decisionmakers who af-
fect who these decisionmakers are."'1 33 Brown echoes Stevenson's
charge by drawing on Charles Hamilton Houston's assessment that "a
lawyer who is not a social engineer is a parasite."' 134 According to
Brown, such a conception of "social engineering" means a "continuing
struggle for justice. ' 135 Stevenson provides an example of this kind of
social engineering by explaining that, although he and his attorneys at
the Equal Justice Initiative in Alabama spend most of their time rep-
resenting clients accused of capital crimes during postconviction, di-
129. Moffit's television appearances include: The Today Show, CNN's Crossfire, ABC News.,
CBS News, CNBC's Rivera Live, America's Talking, ITN British Television, Newstalk Television,
MSNBC's Hardball, FOX News, and Court TV's Cochran & Co.
130. William B. Moffitt, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution




133. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1712.
134. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 297-98.
135. Id. at 298.
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rect appeals, and trials, he has begun to broaden this mandate to
include litigating certain civil rights violations as well.136
In a related vein, Brown suggests that another vision of "social engi-
neering" includes Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's decision in Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada,137 which Brown cites for the proposition that "a
lawyer has an obligation to defend his client in a court of public opin-
ion.' 138 Brown stresses that such a mandate "means a whole new
form of representation is emerging for which we are not trained...
[as] lawyers in individual cases.' 39 The fact that this "new form of
representation" is emerging may be evidenced by tuning into televi-
sion shows such as Larry King Live, in which a string of lawyers read-
ily come forth to defend their clients the moment any accusations are
aired.' 40 In contrast to the onslaught of media appearances for certain
highly publicized cases (or certain highly publicized lawyers), other
lawyers with high-profile cases maintain a policy of not commenting
on their cases before the jury has rendered its decision.14' Many of
these lawyers point to ethical concerns in defending their clients in the
"court of public opinion," citing rules that limit an attorney's ability to
speak to the media about their clients' cases.' 42 Whether these ethical
136. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1711.
137. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
138. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 320 (interpreting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1043). Brown
stated:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she cannot ignore
the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may
recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid adverse consequences of a possi-
ble loss after trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's
reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of
a prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A defense attor-
ney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of
charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the
client does not deserve to be tried.
Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 18, 2003) (attorney Mark
Geragos defending child molestation allegations against Michael Jackson).
141. For example, in the U.S. Northern District of Iowa, Assistant Federal Defender Jane
Kelly represents Luke Helder, the alleged pipe bomber accused of blowing up mailboxes in the
shape of a "smiley face" across the midwest. Despite the media frenzy surrounding Helder's
case, Kelly has not granted any interviews or commented to the press. See, e.g., Colleen Krantz,
Helder Likely To Take Plea Deal, Law Expert Says, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 14, 2002, at 1A
("A representative of the U.S. Public Defender's Office in Cedar Rapids, where Helder's attor-
ney, Jane Kelly, works, said the office won't comment on the case or possible defense strate-
gies."); Colleen Krantz, Helder To Use Insanity Defense, DES MOINEs REGISTER, Aug. 20, 2002,
at IA ("Kelly ... has said she will not comment while the case is ongoing .... ").
142. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (1999) ("A lawyer shall not make
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substan-
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restrictions represent another hurdle that must be either respected or
overcome in the zealous representation of capital clients remains a
divisive question within the criminal defense community.
Regardless of this disagreement, however, Brown also suggests that
criminal defense attorneys must be ever cognizant of how they discuss
general public policy (unrelated to specific clients) within public fo-
rums. To illustrate the importance of this point, Brown described his
own experience debating the Attorney General of Pennsylvania about
the relationship between DNA and capital crimes. Brown described
painstakingly preparing for the debate, which was a radio broadcast
before a live studio audience. It was not until after the debate was
over that Brown realized he had both prepared for and spoken to the
wrong audience-for it was not the limited studio audience who
should have been Brown's primary concern, but the thousands of ra-
dio listeners whom he could not see, but who nevertheless were listen-
ing. Although Brown grounded his analysis in superior statistical
knowledge of the number of people who have been wrongly convicted
of capital crimes and sentenced to death row before advances in DNA
later enabled them to prove their innocence, Brown realized that he
had not prepared an adequate response to the Attorney General's re-
tort. 143 In essence, the Attorney General's response was to "totally
ignore the percentages" and to say that the new advances in DNA
meant "we don't have to worry about innocence" because the reversal
rate "meant that the courts [are] catching due process violations... so
all [is] well and no innocent people [are] being sent to their death. ' 144
Based on this experience, Brown realized that the "failure of those of
us who think it really matters that these disparities exist, to explain
why they exist, why it matters, why it strikes at the very heart of the
perception that our republic is a just place and stands for what it
stands for, that failure is egregious. '145
With this suggestion, Brown clarifies why criminal defense attor-
neys must examine, if not ultimately redefine, their personal position
of what it means to have "an obligation to defend [one's] client in a
tial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding"); id. at R. 3.6(b) (giving
examples of areas to which a "statement" may not refer, such as the possibility of a plea of guilty
or any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect); id. at R. 3.6 (c) (specifying
matters that a lawyer may comment about without elaboration, such as information contained in
the public record); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-107 (1969)
(amended 1981) (trial publicity).
143. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 308-10.




court of public opinion.146 To do so means not only to redefine one's
own identity as a criminal defense attorney, but to comprehend the
importance of understanding and engaging the broader identity of
communities.
VII. THE IDENTITY OF THE COMMUNITY
One of Stevenson's final mandates is the challenge to "engage com-
munities in a very different way. ' 147 Although the public sentiment
can make one feel like one is swimming upstream, Stevenson stresses
that we cannot lose hope and must continue to "deal with the context"
because if "we don't deal with the context, . . . there's just all this
unmitigated anger and then anger will justify virtually anything. ' 148
He explains that we have "to understand that anger ... that context,
and we cannot understand it until we begin to think very broadly
about these issues .... "149 Craig Haney provides one such example of
widening the context in which to understand racial discrimination in
the administration of the death penalty. He describes how, in Chicago
alone, 95% of the children who are in foster care are African Ameri-
can,150 but that "once they are in the child welfare system, African-
American children are less likely to receive in-home services, less
likely to receive mental health services, and [are] more likely to be
institutionalized for their emotional problems."15' By stressing that
"[v]irtually all of the studies of discriminatory death sentencing that
we do begin their analysis long after these factors have taken life-al-
tering affects, ' 152 Haney underscores the importance of widening the
context in which we understand the roots of racial discrimination as a
first step to changing it.
Similarly, Coy Pugh, a former Illinois State Legislator, observes that
part of the wider social context that must be taken into account begins
"[w]hen you look at the fact that school districts [in] Chicago, which
are predominantly black, receive a third of the resources that school
districts in surrounding suburbs receive. ' 153 Such an analysis mirrors
not only Bryan Stevenson's call to broaden the context in which we
146. Id. at 320.
147. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1712.
148. Id. at 1713.
149. Id. at 1714.
150. Haney Transcript, supra note 38, at 216.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 219.
153. Coy Pugh, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sympo-
sium 349 (Oct. 25, 2003) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review).
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understand the roots of discrimination,1 54 but also Rory Little's obser-
vation that discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
happens earlier than the actual charging decision. 155
Indeed, the necessity to recognize the identity of not only a broader
national community, but a broader global perspective, is highlighted
by both Raymond Brown and David Cole. Brown proffers that part
of the background to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education was the influence of the Cold War, which figured promi-
nently in the brief filed on behalf of the Justice Department in support
of Brown: twenty-five of the thirty-seven pages of the brief were de-
voted to placing the issue within the context of the Cold War.156 This
contextual framework included the observation that the "[United
States's] struggle in the Cold War was part of what caused the mass
media to begin to go to Birmingham and cover bus boycotts and to go
to the south and cover student sit-ins. The perception of who we are
to ourselves and to others matters, and justice is at the core of our
right to say we [are] different if indeed we really are. ' 157 Similarly,
David Cole explains:
[T]here may be some interplay between .. .civil liberties and the
war on terrorism and the death penalty .... Ultimately, the govern-
ment is going to be trying to execute some of the people in Guanta-
namo, and it's going to do it in military tribunals, where people
don't have the opportunity to see the evidence against them, where
their chosen counsel don't have the opportunity to see the evidence
against them, . . . where they have no recourse to any independent
review, much less habeas corpus, of any meaningful sense, and they
are all foreign nationals [in] Guatanamo, from [forty-two] different
nations and that has already generated a tremendous amount of
criticism around the world, that undermines our efforts in the war
on terrorism. [C]ooperation is going to be less, if people are critical
of the way we are treating their people.... I think [that in] seeking
to execute them in a trial that has the appearance of justice, I think
[that] will bring a tremendous amount of political pressure to the
United States, and that will come from around the world .... 158
In essence, just as the United States's struggle during the Cold War
was intricately related to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, so might the United States's war on terror insti-
gate significant improvements in combating racial discrimination in-
herent in the administration of the death penalty.
154. See generally Stevenson, supra note 7.
155. Little Transcript, supra note 74, at 204.
156. Brown Transcript, supra note 45, at 311.
157. Id. at 311-12.
158. David Cole, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution Sym-




There is no more fitting conclusion to summarize the Symposium
mandate than to recall Stevenson's stirring description of listening to
deaf children sing in his church in Alabama and how the "the whole
church had to make a lot of noise" before the children would begin
singing, then once "[t]hey started a rhythm .... with the rhythm the
whole church began to rock. 1 59 We must not be afraid to start a
rhythm throughout the country, to engage the public, the media, the
judges, the juries, the prosecutors, and even the defense attorneys, in
passionate discussions about racial justice concerns. We must not be
afraid to "do the difficult." For it is only by speaking in a language
that can be understood-whether it be rocking the church or rocking
the courtroom-that we create a chance for dialogue, and with dia-
logue, we create not only the hope for change, but the real possibility
of it.
159. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 1714.
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